School Districts' Negligence and Nuisance Claims Against Social Media Companies Rejected by California Court of Appeal

· Reason

Some short excerpts from the long decision Thursday in Social Media Cases (San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.) by California Court of Appeal Justice Anne Richardson, joined by Justices Elwood Lui and Stephen Goorvitch):

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In recent years, various plaintiffs have brought numerous legal claims against social media companies. In this opinion, we address only two causes of action—negligence and public nuisance—in the context of the laws of California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island, brought by school districts…. Plaintiffs generally claimed Defendants created a "mental health crisis" among their students that harmed Plaintiffs by disrupting their educational mission, requiring them to spend more money and staff time to address student mental health and discipline, and causing students to vandalize their property….

We acknowledge the serious allegations of mental health harms experienced by many students and the impact of those harms on Plaintiffs' schools and student bodies…. [But the relevant precedents] establish that these plaintiffs cannot proceed under the legal theories and factual allegations they have pled….

Negligence Causes of Action …

Here, Plaintiffs allege they suffered three general kinds of harm: (1) "incur[ring] significant financial costs" to address the youth mental health crisis allegedly created by Defendants' platforms; (2) "frustrat[ion] [of their] pedagogical mission" in diverting staff time and resources from education to counter the disruptive effects of the crisis; and (3) property damage inflicted by students. In part V., we conclude Plaintiffs' allegations their missions were frustrated do not state a cognizable negligence claim, and in part VI., we conclude Defendants have immunity from liability arising from Plaintiffs' alleged property damage. {Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants directly damaged their property; instead, they allege Defendants' platforms influenced students to vandalize school property because the platforms showed them so-called "challenge videos," created by third parties, that encouraged vandalizing school property. The trial court determined [47 U.S.C. § 230] provided Defendants immunity from liability arising from the challenge videos. We agree.}

That leaves Plaintiffs with only alleged financial harms …. The crux of the negligence causes of action is the applicability of the so-called "economic loss rule." … "… In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted 'purely economic losses,' meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage" [even as to foreseeable economic losses -EV]…. "[A]ssume[ ] a defendant negligently causes an automobile accident that blocks a major traffic artery such as a bridge or tunnel. Although defendant would be liable for personal injuries and property damage suffered in such an accident, it is doubtful any court would allow recovery by the myriad of third parties who might claim economic losses because the bridge or tunnel was impassible." …

Public Nuisance Causes of Action

Nuisance suits are generally either public or private. "[A] private nuisance is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land[,] while a public nuisance is [based] upon an interference with the rights of the community at large."

"Nuisance has been described as an 'impenetrable jungle'" that "'mean[s] all things to all people'" and "'is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.'" Thus, while nuisance is often defined broadly, many courts have limited its scope in practice. For example, the Washington Supreme Court expressly limits nuisance claims "to property infringement [and] threats to health and safety." Some of our fellow Courts of Appeal have prohibited bringing products liability claims in the guise of public nuisance actions.

Such limits are often imposed because of a concern that "nuisance 'would [otherwise] become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.'" In the products liability context, "'[a]ll a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario describing a known or perceived harm … that can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company … makes, markets and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and born.'"

The trial court concluded Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead public nuisance because the harms alleged to have befallen individual student users of Defendants' platforms did not amount to a public nuisance, even when "considered collectively." While our analysis may differ from the trial court's in some particulars, we ultimately agree Plaintiffs' efforts to state a cause of action for public nuisance fail under the laws of California, Washington, and Florida….

California nuisance is broadly defined by statute as "[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance."

Public nuisance is defined by statute as "one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." "[P]ublic nuisances are offenses against, or interferences with, the exercise of rights common to the public." "It is [the] community aspect of the public nuisance … that distinguishes it from its private cousin," and makes it suitable "to protect the quality of organized social life."

Perhaps because of those broad definitions, our Legislature has codified who has standing to bring a public nuisance action. Certain persons may bring an action for public nuisance when it is "specially injurious" to them or when their property is "injuriously affected or [their] personal enjoyment is lessened."

By contrast, a "public body or officer authorized thereto" can bring an action to abate a public nuisance. And the State or designated county or city officials, in their representative capacities, can bring an action limited to abatement under Code of Civil Procedure section 731. San Diego's action, however, is not limited to abatement, but seeks damages for harms allegedly caused by the nuisance. The only recognized exception to the limitation on remedy is that a public entity may seek damages when it sues in its role as a property owner.

While San Diego makes a number of arguments related to its public nuisance theory, some of which have divided our fellow Courts of Appeal, we need not parse them in detail because San Diego failed to adequately allege its standing to bring a public nuisance cause of action….

San Diego first argues it has standing under Civil Code section 3493. That statute expressly allows "[a] private person" to bring a public nuisance action…. [G]overnment entities are not "private person[s]" for purposes of section 3493….

In the alternative, San Diego argues it may bring a public nuisance cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 731. That statute provides "[a]n action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance, as defined in Section 3479 of the Civil Code," and damages may be recovered. …

San Diego's complaint did not adequately plead its property was "injuriously affected" or its "personal enjoyment [was] lessened" by the alleged nuisance of Defendants' platforms…. Rather, the complaint's focus throughout its 286 pages is on the "unprecedented mental health crisis" among students and its disruption to schools' public educational mission…. Any connection to property here is abstract at best.

Accepting San Diego's position would convert virtually any personal injury affecting a property owner into a nuisance. For example, consider a homeowner whose son breaks his leg in a car accident with a negligent driver, rendering him unable to use the stairs in the home. Even if the homeowner must spend time and resources to help her son navigate the home, she has no nuisance cause of action against the driver on the ground the driver interfered with her use and enjoyment of her property….

* * *

Because all Plaintiffs' causes of action fail for the reasons discussed, we do not consider whether they are entirely barred by section 230 and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution….

Jonathan H. Blavin and Victoria A. Degtyareva (Munger, Tolles & Olson), Paul J. Watford, Bailey J. Langner, David P. Mattern and Geoffrey M. Drake (King & Spalding), Mark W. Mosier, Ashley M. Simonsen and Christian J. Pistilli (Covington & Burling), and Ashley W. Hardin, George A. Borden and Neelum J. Wadhwani (Williams & Connolly) represent defendants.

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